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None
ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR DEFENDANTS:
None
PROCEEDINGS (IN CHAMBERS): ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT INTERNET BRANDS,
INC.’S MOTION TO DISMISS 
[filed 10/17/2016; Docket No. 46]
On October 17, 2016, Defendant Internet Brands, Inc. (“Defendant” or “Internet Brands”)
filed a Motion to Dismiss.  On October 24, 2016, Plaintiff Jane Doe No. 14 (“Plaintiff” or “Jane
Doe”) filed her Opposition.  On October 31, 2016, Defendant filed a Reply.  Pursuant to Rule 78 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Rule 7-15, the Court found the matter appropriate
for submission on the papers without oral argument.  The matter was, therefore, removed from the
Court’s November 14, 2016 hearing calendar and the parties were given advance notice.  After
considering the moving, opposing, and reply papers, and the arguments therein, the Court rules as
follows:
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
Plaintiff alleges that Internet Brands owns and operates the website modelmayhem.com,
which it purchased in 2008.  Model Mayhem is a networking site for professional and aspiring
models to market their services.  It has over 600,000 members. Plaintiff Jane Doe was an aspiring
model who became a member of Model Mayhem.
Unbeknownst to Jane Doe, two persons, Lavont Flanders and Emerson Callum, were using
Model Mayhem to identify targets for a rape scheme, allegedly as early as 2006.  Flanders and
Callum are not alleged to have posted their own profiles on the website.  Instead, they browsed
1The Ninth Circuit extensively summarized the allegations of Plaintiff’s Complaint in its
opinion filed on May 31, 2016 (Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc., 824 F. 3d 846, 848-49 (9th Cir. 2016)),
and the Court has in large part adopted that summary.  
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profiles on Model Mayhem posted by models, contacted potential victims using fake identities,
posed as talent scouts, and lured the victims to south Florida for phony modeling auditions. Once a
victim arrived, Flanders and Callum used a date rape drug to put the victim in a semi-catatonic
state, raped her, and recorded the rape on videotape for sale and distribution as pornography.
In 2008, Internet Brands purchased Model Mayhem from Donald and Taylor Waitts (the
“Waitts”), the original developers of the site. Shortly after the purchase, Internet Brands learned
that Flanders and Callum were using the website to perpetrate their rape scheme. Although
Plaintiff does not allege the precise details of how Internet Brands obtained that information, she
alleges that the company “as early as August, 2010, knew that two individuals, Lavont Flanders
and Emerson Callum, had been criminally charged in this scheme, and further knew from the
criminal charges, the particular details of the scheme, including how MODELMAYHEM.COM had
been used in the scheme and its members victimized.” Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Internet
Brands knew that:
a. Lavont Flanders and Emerson Callum would contact female MODELMAYHEM.COM
members, using fake identities, disguised as talent scouts.
b. Lavont Flanders and Emerson Callum would lure female MODELMAYHEM.COM
members to South Florida to participate in fake auditions for a fraudulent modeling
contract opportunity.
c. Lavont Flanders and Emerson Callum would drug the female MODELMAYHEM.COM
members with a date-rape drug during the fake audition.
d. Emerson Callum would then rape the unknowingly drugged women.
e. Lavont Flanders and Emerson Callum would record the rape on video camera.
f. Lavont Flanders and Emerson Callum would produce the rape videos and distribute
the video on the internet, guised as consensual hardcore pornography.
Complaint at ¶ 9.  Plaintiff also alleges that Internet Brands sued the Waitts in August 2010 for
failing to disclose the potential for civil suits arising from the criminal activities of Flanders and
Callum.
Plaintiff’s allegations suggest that Internet Brands obtained the information from an outside
source, not from its monitoring of postings on the Model Mayhem website. As noted above,
Flanders and Callum did not post on the website.
In February 2011, several months after Internet Brands had discovered the criminal activity,
Flanders, pretending to be a talent scout and using a false identity, contacted Jane Doe “through”
the Model Mayhem website and lured her to south Florida for a fake audition. There, Flanders and
Callum drugged her, raped her, and recorded the rape.  
Jane Doe filed this diversity action against Internet Brands in this Court, alleging one claim
for relief for negligent failure to warn under California law. She alleges that Internet Brands knew
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about the criminal activities of Flanders and Callum but failed to warn Model Mayhem users that
they were at risk of being victimized. She further alleges that this failure to warn caused her to
become a victim of the rape scheme.
On July 3, 2012, Internet Brands filed a motion to dismiss the action under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), on the ground that her claim was barred by the Communications Decency
Act (“CDA”), 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2012). The Court granted the motion to dismiss and dismissed the
action with prejudice on August 16, 2012.  Jane Doe appealed that Order to the Ninth Circuit.
After lengthy appellate proceedings, the Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that the CDA did
not bar Jane Doe’s failure to warn claim.  Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc., 824 F. 3d 846, 849-54 (9th
Cir. 2016).  The Ninth Circuit, however, “express[ed] no opinion on the viability of the failure to
warn allegations on the merits,”  stating,  “[a]lthough we assume that Internet Brands may contest
the scope of the duty to warn under California law and in particular, the existence of the required
special relationship, that issue is not before us.”  Id. at 850, 854.  
After remand to this Court, Internet Brands has again moved to dismiss this action, this time
on the grounds that it had no duty to warn Jane Doe under California law.2 
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the
legal sufficiency of the claims asserted in the complaint.  “A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper only
where there is either a ‘lack of a cognizable legal theory’ or ‘the absence of sufficient facts alleged
under a cognizable legal theory.’”  Summit Technology, Inc. v. High-Line Medical Instruments Co.,
Inc., 922 F. Supp. 299, 304 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (quoting Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d
696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988)).  However, “[w]hile a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of
his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action will not do.”  Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007) (internal citations and alterations omitted).  “[F]actual allegations must be enough to raise a
right to relief above the speculative level.”  Id.
In deciding a motion to dismiss, a court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint
and must construe those allegations in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.  See, e.g.,
Wyler Summit Partnership v. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc., 135 F.3d 658, 661 (9th Cir. 1998). 
“However, a court need not accept as true unreasonable inferences, unwarranted deductions of
fact, or conclusory legal allegations cast in the form of factual allegations.”  Summit Technology,
922 F. Supp. at 304 (citing Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981) cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1031 (1981)). 
2Internet Brands’ characterization of this lawsuit as Plaintiff’s “desire to find a corporation to
pay financially for the alleged criminal and violent misconduct of two men unaffiliated with the
corporation” is wholly inappropriate and exceeds the bounds of legitimate advocacy.  See Motion
at 2.  It demonstrates a total lack of compassion for the terrible crime perpetrated on Plaintiff and
resulting damages suffered by an innocent, unsuspecting victim. 
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Where a motion to dismiss is granted, a district court must decide whether to grant leave to
amend.  Generally, the Ninth Circuit has a liberal policy favoring amendments and, thus, leave to
amend should be freely granted.  See, e.g., DeSoto v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., 957 F.2d 655,
658 (9th Cir. 1992).  However, a Court does not need to grant leave to amend in cases where the
Court determines that permitting a plaintiff to amend would be an exercise in futility.  See, e.g.,
Rutman Wine Co. v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 829 F.2d 729, 738 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Denial of leave to
amend is not an abuse of discretion where the pleadings before the court demonstrate that further
amendment would be futile.”).
III. DISCUSSION
In order to state a claim for negligence under California law, a plaintiff must allege facts
demonstrating: (1) a legal duty to use due care; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) proximate or legal
cause; and (4) resulting injury  Ladd v. Cty. of San Mateo, 12 Cal. 4th 913, 917–18 (1996). 
Internet Brands moves to dismiss Jane Doe’s negligence claim on the grounds that it did not have
a legal duty to warn Jane Doe and other Model Mayhem users that they were at risk of being
victimized by the rape scheme.
The existence of a “duty” is a question of law.  Thompson v. County of Alameda, 27 Cal.3d
741, 750 (1980).  “[L]egal duties are not discoverable facts of nature, but merely conclusory
expressions that, in cases of a particular type, liability should be imposed for damage done.” 
Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of California, 17 Cal.3d 425, 434 (1976).  In other words, “[a]
determination that a duty exists amounts to a policy decision that a particular plaintiff should be
protected.”  Smith v. Freund, 192 Cal. App. 4th 466, 472 (2011) (citation omitted).  Policy
considerations involved in determining whether a defendant owes the plaintiff a duty to use
reasonable care include (1) the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, (2) the degree of certainty
that the plaintiff suffered injury, (3) the closeness of connection between the defendant's conduct
and the injury suffered, (4) the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, (5) the policy of
preventing future harm, (6) the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the
community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and (7) the
availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.  Rowland v. Christian, 69
Cal.2d 108, 113 (1968).
In determining whether a defendant owes a duty to a plaintiff in a particular case, courts
generally distinguish between misfeasance and nonfeasance.  See, e.g., Seo v. All-Makes
Overhead Doors, 97 Cal. App. 4th 1193, 1202 (2002). “Misfeasance exists when the defendant is
responsible for making the plaintiff's position worse, i.e., defendant has created a risk. Conversely,
nonfeasance is found when the defendant has failed to aid plaintiff through beneficial intervention.” 
Weirum v. RKO Gen., Inc., 15 Cal. 3d 40, 49 (1975).  In cases of misfeasance, the question of duty
is governed by the standards of ordinary care, i.e. “a person ordinarily is obligated to exercise due
care in his or her own actions so as not to create an unreasonable risk of injury to others, and this
legal duty generally is owed to the class of persons who it is reasonably foreseeable may be
injured as the result of the actor's conduct.” Lugtu v. California Highway Patrol, 26 Cal. 4th 703,
716 (2001).  See also Cal. Civ. Code § 1714 (“Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his
or her willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or
skill in the management of his or her property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or
by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself or herself.”). 
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In contrast, in cases of nonfeasance, “[a]s a general rule, one owes no duty to control the
conduct of another, nor to warn those endangered by such conduct.”  Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ.
of California, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 435 (1976) (internal citations omitted).  “[T]he courts have carved out
an exception to this rule in cases in which the defendant stands in some special relationship to
either the person whose conduct needs to be controlled or in a relationship to the foreseeable
victim of that conduct.”  Id. “[A] duty of care may arise from either (a) a special relation between the
actor and the third person which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person's
conduct, or (b) a special relation between the actor and the other which gives to the other a right of
protection.”  Id.  “Resolution of the issue whether a special relationship exists giving rise to a duty
to protect (or warn) comprehends consideration of the same factors underlying any duty of care
analysis.”  Hansra v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. App. 4th 630, 646 (1992).  “In other words, to say that
a “special relationship” exists is to say nothing other than the factors favoring imposition of a duty
of care in particular circumstances outweigh the countervailing factors (one of which is that the
harm was caused by a third person).”  Id.
“Special relationships” that courts have found to trigger a duty to protect another from
foreseeable injury caused by a third party include, for example, those between: (1) business
proprietors, such as shopping centers, restaurants and bars, and their tenants, patrons, or invitees;
(2) common carriers and passengers; (3) innkeepers and their guests; and (4) mental health
professionals and their patients.  See Delgado v. Trax Bar & Grill, 36 Cal. 4th 224, 235, 236 n.14
(2005).  “The special relationship situations generally involve some kind of dependency or
reliance.”  Olson v. Children's Home Soc'y, 204 Cal. App. 3d 1362, 1366 (1988).
This case involves nonfeasance rather than misfeasance. Indeed, in her Complaint, Plaintiff
does not allege that Internet Brands’ actions somehow created the risk  faced by its members or
made Jane Doe’s position, by its actions, worse.  Rather, she alleges that Internet Brands failed to
warn modelmayhem.com users of the danger presented by the criminal acts of a third party. See
Complaint at ¶¶ 22-39.   Although Jane Doe argues in her Opposition that Internet Brands
“created” the peril or risk, there is no support for that theory. Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument,
merely allowing members to continue using the Model Mayhem website without warning them of
the rape scheme does not, by itself, constitute the creation of the risk or peril.  See, e.g., Conti v.
Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc., 235 Cal. App. 4th 1214 (2015) (treating
church’s failure to warn its congregation that one of its members was a convicted child molester as
one of nonfeasance).  Accordingly, unless a “special relationship” existed between Internet Brands
and Jane Doe, or between Internet Brands and Flanders or Callum, Internet Brands had no duty to
warn. 
Not surprisingly, Plaintiff does not argue that Internet Brands had a special relationship with
Flanders or Callum.  Indeed, the Court easily concludes that Internet Brands did not have a special
relationship with Flanders or Callum, especially given that Flanders and Callum did not post their
own profiles to the Model Mayhem website and used fake identities to lure their potential victims. 
The more difficult question is whether Internet Brands had a “special relationship” with Jane Doe,
who along with at least 600,000 others, were members of the Model Mayhem website. The
relationship between Jane Doe and Internet Brands, a website operator, does not fall under any of
the well-recognized “special relationships” under California law, and the Court has not found, nor
have the parties cited, any case in which courts have found the existence of a “special relationship”
or imposed a duty under similar or analogous circumstances. 
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Based on the existing case law and application of the Rowland factors, the Court concludes
that Internet Brands did not have a “special relationship” with Jane Doe and thus did not have a
duty to warn her that she was at risk of being victimized by the rape scheme.  In a case with the
most analogous facts, Conti v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc., the California
Court of Appeal found that there was no “special relationship” or duty. In that case, the court
considered whether a religious organization owed a duty to inform its congregation that a fellow
member was a child molester.  Although the religious organization was aware of the member’s
child molestation conviction as well as the “high recidivism” associated with child molestation, the
court concluded that no “special relationship” existed and the religious organization had no duty to
warn the congregation.3
While Jane Doe’s injuries are no doubt severe, the Court concludes that there is no
exceptional reason to depart from the general common law rule that “one owes no duty to control
the conduct of another, nor to warn those endangered by such conduct.”  See Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d
at 435.  Although the Court is appalled by the tragic events in this case, the Court concludes that
the policy considerations identified in Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal.2d 108, 113 (1968) do not
support finding a duty in this case.  Although it may have been foreseeable that Flanders and
Callum would strike again, Internet Brands only had knowledge of a threat to its member base at
large, not to any specific member.  Imposing a duty to warn under these circumstances would, in
the Court’s opinion, only minimally increase the precautions already taken by website users, and
would also likely cause website operators to inundate and overwhelm their users with warnings,
ultimately diluting the effectiveness of such warnings. Cf. Thompson v. County of Alameda, 27
Cal.3d 741, 755 (1980) (“In our view, the generalized warnings sought to be required here would
do little to increase the precautions of any particular members of the public who already may have
become conditioned to locking their doors, avoiding dark and deserted streets, instructing their
children to beware of strangers and taking other precautions. By their very numbers the force of
3In the most analogous case relied on by Plaintiff, O’Hara v. Western Seven Trees Corp. 75
Cal. App. 3d 798 (1977), a tenant who was raped in her apartment sued her landlord on theories of
negligence and deceit.  The landlord knew of prior rapes at the apartment complex, was aware of
the conditions indicating a likelihood that the rapist would repeat the attacks, and had been
provided with composite drawings of the suspect and a general description of his modus operandi
by the local police.  The landlord not only failed to advise the plaintiff of the crimes, but assured
her, as a prospective tenant, that the premises were safe and were patrolled at all times by
professional guards. The California Court of Appeal found that the landlord had a duty to warn
Plaintiff, stating “respondents’ liability for failure to warn is not founded upon their control over the
common areas but upon their position of superior knowledge and upon their alleged
misrepresentations.”  75 Cal. App. 3d at 803.  The Court finds this case distinguishable for a
number of reasons, including that the landlord’s liability was founded in part on alleged
misrepresentations, and that it involved the landlord-tenant relationship, which is a recognized
special relationship under California law.  See Wylie v. Gresch, 191 Cal. App. 3d 412, 419 n.7
(1987) (“For that decision to be read as one involving a simple ‘failure to warn’ is to read too much
into it, and to leave too much out.  The crucial fact there was the misrepresentation coupled with
the failure to warn of a specific set of similar crimes which had been perpetrated over a period of
time and which were alleged to involve access through a common area over which the landlords
maintained control.”). 
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the multiple warnings required to accompany the release of all probationers with a potential for
violence would be diluted as to each member of the public who by such release thereby becomes
a potential victim.”).  Moreover, as argued by Internet Brands and amicus curiae in the Ninth
Circuit, imposing a duty in this case would likely have a “chilling effect” on the internet by opening
the floodgates of litigation.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that Internet Brands had no duty to warn
Jane Doe or Model Mayhem users that they were at risk of being victimized by the rape scheme. 
Accordingly, the Court concludes that Jane Doe fails to state a claim for negligence under
California law.
IV. CONCLUSION
Internet Brands’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.  Although the Court recognizes that this
Circuit has a liberal policy favoring amendments and that leave to amend should be freely granted,
the Court is not required to grant leave to amend if the Court determines that permitting Plaintiff to
amend would be an exercise in futility.  See, e.g., Rutman Wine Co. v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 829
F.2d 729, 738 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Denial of leave to amend is not an abuse of discretion where the
pleadings before the court demonstrate that further amendment would be futile.”).  “Leave to
amend may be denied if a court determines that allegation of other facts consistent with the
challenged pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.”  Abagninin v. AMVAC Chemical Corp.,
545 F.3d 733, 742 (9th Cir. 2008) (quotations and citations omitted).  In this case, Plaintiff has
failed to provide the Court with any facts or argument that indicate leave to amend would not be
futile.   See Deutsch v. Turner Corp., 324 F.3d 692, 717-718 (9th Cir. 2003) (upholding denial of
leave to amend on the basis of futility where the plaintiffs proffered facts to the district court that
were insufficient to support tolling and failed to offer additional facts on appeal).  Accordingly, the
Court denies Plaintiff leave to amend her Complaint.  
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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